# Worked Example

This example walks through a full seven-day epoch with two public models, identical forward returns, and staggered voter deposits.&#x20;

<table><thead><tr><th width="246">Symbol</th><th>Meaning</th><th>Fixed value here</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><em>E</em></td><td>Epoch emission</td><td>100 SLINKY</td></tr><tr><td><em>τ</em> </td><td>Return look-back window</td><td>7 days</td></tr><tr><td><em>R</em><sub><em>i</em></sub> </td><td>Net return over <em>τ</em> </td><td>5 % for both models</td></tr><tr><td><em>A</em><sub><em>i</em></sub> </td><td>Audit pass flag</td><td>1 (quorum reached)</td></tr></tbody></table>

## Stake schedule

<table><thead><tr><th>Model</th><th>Voter</th><th width="127.28271484375">Stake (SLINKY)</th><th width="146.2349853515625">Day deposited</th><th width="108.9090576171875">Days locked</th><th>Stake-days</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>A</strong></td><td>V1</td><td>10</td><td>Monday</td><td>7</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>V2</td><td>20</td><td>Thursday</td><td>4</td><td>80</td></tr><tr><td><strong>B</strong></td><td>V1</td><td>20</td><td>Monday</td><td>7</td><td>140</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>V2</td><td>30</td><td>Wednesday</td><td>5</td><td>150</td></tr></tbody></table>

Σ<sub>A​</sub>=30, Σ<sub>B</sub>​=50

## Slinky Scores

<figure><img src="https://4263197242-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2FtVM0qTwW1SmwvBaQwlXq%2Fuploads%2FfnTdTiMqeUxBd10MHFOD%2Fimage.png?alt=media&#x26;token=95e37be5-faf5-4318-a61f-ae73a72f1879" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

Model shares

<figure><img src="https://4263197242-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2FtVM0qTwW1SmwvBaQwlXq%2Fuploads%2FyfmiVGhMpCZ25rpFWNfD%2FScreenshot%202025-09-04%20at%201.21.30%20PM.png?alt=media&#x26;token=d6e0a9ce-5025-4213-a66e-789b98766246" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

## Pool allocation and 50 : 50 split

| Model | Pool share (SLINKY) | Creator 50 % | Curator pool 50 % |
| ----- | ------------------- | ------------ | ----------------- |
| A     | 46.62               | 23.31        | 23.31             |
| B     | 53.38               | 26.69        | 26.69             |

## Curator distribution (stake-days weighting)

<figure><img src="https://4263197242-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2FtVM0qTwW1SmwvBaQwlXq%2Fuploads%2Fb5GCTQAIMDx1Ol8pzrlM%2FScreenshot%202025-09-04%20at%201.22.25%20PM.png?alt=media&#x26;token=13c3997d-8ab6-4738-ab0f-1987216b3ebe" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

<table><thead><tr><th width="218.46734619140625">Model</th><th width="234.25640869140625">Voter</th><th>Payout (SLINKY)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>A</td><td>V1</td><td>23.31 × 0.4667 = 10.88</td></tr><tr><td>A</td><td>V2</td><td>23.31 × 0.5333 = 12.43</td></tr><tr><td>B</td><td>V1</td><td>26.69 × 0.4828 = 12.88</td></tr><tr><td>B</td><td>V2</td><td>26.69 × 0.5172 = 13.81</td></tr></tbody></table>

## Observations

* **Diminishing stake influence**: Logarithmic weighting prevents raw capital from overpowering performance. Model B holds 67 % more stake than Model A but earns only 14 % more creator reward.
* **Early conviction rewarded**: V1 in both models receives the larger share of curator emissions despite equal or lower absolute stake due to longer lock duration.
* **Performance oriented**: If Model A had posted 10 % return while Model B stayed at 5 %, Model A’s score would exceed Model B’s even with less capital.
